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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 256 
Accident time: 13:40 Accident Date: 25/08/1999 
Where it occurred: Plowshare Minefield, 
Cordon Sanitaire 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: KMS 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: M969 AP blast Ground condition: woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 18/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 





At the time of this accident the demining company operated in two-man teams using a one-
man drill. One deminer looked for tripwires, cut undergrowth, used the detector and 
excavated finds while the other watched from a safe distance and "controlled" him. The group 
issued frontal protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while 
excavating. 
An internal Accident report was made available by the demining group in December 1999. 
The report was dated 3rd August 1999,which was before the accident occurred - so either the 
date of the report or the accident date was an error. The following summarises the content of 
the report. 
The victim was engaged in widening a breaching lane at 13:40 when the accident occurred. 
He was not using approved marking methods [using none] and the accident occurred 3 
metres in front of his base stick. His equipment had been removed from the site but witnesses 
confirmed that the victim's visor and prodder were some metres behind the victim [visor not 
worn] and that the handle of his trowel was a metre from the accident site. 
At the time of the accident, the victim's partner had left the site to fetch more area-marking 
sticks. 
Immediately after the accident the victim was recovered from the unmarked area and his 
"boots, watch and fragmentation vest" removed. At this time "the casualty was struggling so 
restraint was necessary". Field medics treated the casualty and brought him to the ambulance 
at the start of the breach. The ambulance had entered the breach and had to "conduct 
numerous turns within the breach to turn around". 
All clearance at the site was halted. 
The investigators found no evidence of excavation around the blast crater, which was "cone 
shaped and symmetrical". The shaft of his trowel was in the crater. They stated that "the 
blade of the trowel was not found and is more than likely the instrument which caused the 
injuries". 
A chronology of events related that the accident occurred at 13:40, the ambulance left for the 
air strip for Medevac at 14:32 and the Medevac aircraft left taking the victim to hospital at 
16:16, [more than 2 ½ hours after the accident occurred]. 
The investigators decided that the mine was an M969, although the type was "not confirmed". 
 
Conclusions 
The investigators concluded that the victim was working without a visor, not marking correctly 
and had used "incorrect excavation methods". They found that his partner "was not present to 
correct any faults". In their opinion "complacency had set in" and the victim was taking short 
cuts. They decided that immediate treatment and medevac was "adequate" but that too many 
people had been involved in the reaction. Casualty recovery had been "conducted without 
control, placing further risk on those persons present". 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that a seven day period of complete re-training should start, 
and that deminers should have warnings about complacency and the need to work to SOPs 
stressed. They stated that "all personnel will be evaluated. All re-test failures will be released 
from the project. For all personnel who pass the evaluations, and further breaches of safety 
will result in instant dismissal". 
Further recommendation included re-training in Medevac procedures for field supervisors, the 
rule that medics should never enter a breach that is only a meter wide (in these cases the 





Victim number: 330 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: more than 2 hours 40 
minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 






See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A "Preliminary medical report" was made available by the demining group in December 1999. 
It stated that between 14:00 and 14:25 the victim was attended at the site hospital, then sent 
to Mukumbura airstrip for medevac. The vehicle broke down at Msingwa river and the victim 
was transferred to an accompanying vehicle. The evacuation aircraft arrived at 15:45 and left 
for the capital city at 16:16. 
The "casualty sustained severe deep maxillofacial injury with right hand second degree 
burns". "2-way intravenous fluid giving lines established at time of handing over casualty". 
In an interview with senior staff at the demining group in December 1999, they said that the 
victim had died about a month after the accident while still in hospital. His demining tool 
(trowel) had struck his face side-on and “cut it in half”. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was in breach of many basic SOPs and his errors went uncorrected. The decision of the 
management group to impose re-training and testing implied that the urgent need for 
improvement was recognised, although local employment laws may have made it difficult to 
implement. It is not known whether the recommendations were carried out. The secondary 
cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
In an interview with representatives of the demining group's management in December 1999, 
the researcher was told that the head of the tool was believed to have struck the victim in the 
face and caused injuries that were eventually fatal. 
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The deminer's trowel was a locally made item with a steel handle welded to a steel blade. The 
picture above shows one of the group's trowels after a similar accident. In this case the trowel 
is still in one piece although badly deformed.  
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